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Summary findings
Charging for social marginal costs is efficient regardless  correlation  in the residuals to model the dynamics
of price elasticities, but the importance  of getting prices  properly.  The resulting model  is one  of almost
"right"  is grearer  the more manageable, or elastic, the  immediate adjustment,  wirh a short-term  price elasticitry
demand. In efficient pollurion  control  programs, options  for gasoline close ro the long-term  estimate  of -0.8.
to make cars cleaner are combined  optimally with  The model displays elasticities  that are lower (for
demand conservation.  The roles plaved by -cleaner  cars"  income) and higher (for price) than  those Pindvck
as compared  with 'iewer  trips"  are determined-b  hypothesized,  and are within the range of elasticities
empirical parameters:  cheap, clean technologies would  found  in industrial countries..
imply a grear role for cleaner cars, while high demand  Byproducts of the model: The clascicity of car
elasticities lead to a greater role for demand reduction.  purchases with respect to gasoline prices is positivc.
In seminal research,  Pindyck found evidence to.  Scrappage decisions are affected by income and by car
supporr his hypothesis that demand for commodiries  and gasoline prices. And these elasticities are nor
such as gasoline should have lower price elasricities and  significantly different  in the richer  states.
higher income  elasticiries in developing than  in industrial  For policy purposes,  these findings do not svpport
countries.  Eskeland and  Feyzioglu estimate a model of  "elasticitv pessimism." The use of car senrices is sensitive
gasoline demand  and car ownership in Mexico,  using a  to pricing, which suggests that  consumers.  for some of
panel of annual observations by state.  KCey  features they  their demand,  have reasonably  good alternatives  ro car
introduce  are instrumental  variables on differenced data  services. Consideration  of external  cosrs - such as
and the treatment  of (1) possible dynamics, (2)  accidents, congestion, air pollution,  and road damage-
measurement  errors  in the data, and  (3) unobserved  thus involve considerable  demand conservation.
characteristics  in individual states. They use tests of serial
This paper -a  product  of the Public Economics Division, Policy Research Department  is part of a larger effort in the
department  to scudy environmental  policy problems  in developing countries,  emphasizing fiscal pelicy  insrruments. The
study was funded by the  Bank's Research Support  Budget under the research project 'Pollution  and the Choice of Policy
Instruments  in Developing Countries"  (RPO 67648).  Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contacr  Carlina Jones, room  N10-063,  extension  37699  (31 pages).June
1994.
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This  econometric  study  is  a  part  of  a:broader  research  effort  on  the  economics
of  pollution  control  policies  in  developing  countries.  Our  motivation  for  studying
the  determinants  of  demand  for  cars  and  gasoline  is  one  of  the  many  possible  ones:  we
want  to  know  the  extent  to  which  demand  for  polluting  goods  and  services  is  sensitive
to  prices  and  income  developments.  The  study  and  its  results,  however,  should  be  of
more  general  interest.  It  may  be  of  interest  from  the  point  of  view  of  an  applied
econometrician  --  using  some  new  techniques  and  data  to  examine  an  old  problem  with
real-world  data.  constraints.  It  may*  also  be  of  interest  to  those  interested  in
demand  for  cars  and  gasoline,  either  because  they  may  find  good  ideas  on  how  to  study
the  topic,  or  because  they  may  find  use  for  our  actual  results.
Our  research  project  on  the  economics  of  pollution  control  policies  in
developing  countries  has  emphasized  two  major  lines  of  inquiry  that  has  caused  our
interest  in  the  demand  for  polluting  goods  and  services.1
One  is  that  a  potential,  least  cost  program  can  deliver  pollution  reductions
either  by  making  each  activity  "cleaner"  per  unit  of  input  or  output  (illustratively,
we  may  call  this  cleaner  cars  and  fuels,  or  technical  controls),  or  by  scaling  down
the  level  of  polluting  activities  (we  may  call  this  fewer  polluting  trips).  Such  a
least  cost  program  could,  theoretically  at  least.  be  induced  by  first  best
instruments  such  as  tradeable  emission  permits  or  emission  taxes,  based  on  monitoring
of  individual  emissions.  If  such  programs  had  been  in  place,  then  one  could  estimate
the  emission  reductions  provided  at  different  tax  rates,  at  least  in  reduced  form,
and  perhaps  even  recover  the  relative  roles  of  cleaner  trips  and  fewer  trips.  Given
I  Halvorsen  and  Ruby  (1981),  and  Freeman  (1982)  present  broader  treatments  of  the
costs  and  benefits  of  air  pollution  control.  Harrison  (1975)  covers  the  same  field,
with  an  emphasis  on  vehicular  emissions,  and  the  distribution  across  households  of
costs  and  benefits.
- 1~~~~~~~~that  such  programs  are  not  in  place,  however,  one  needs  to  go  the  indirect  route  of
estimating  the  costs  at  which  emission  reductions  can  be  provided  through  trip
reductions  and  technical  controls  respectively.  Such  estimate  can  then  be  used  to
estimate  both  the  control  costs  for  potential  least  cost  programs,  and  the  excessive
.costs  associated  with  programs  that  do  not  combine  optimally  the  various  ways  by
which  emission  reductions  can  be  provided.
Another  reason  for  -inquiring  about  the  demand  for  polluting  goods  and  services
such  as  cars  and  gasoline  is  our  belief  that  costs  of  monitoring  and  enforcement
often  will  make  the  use  of  first  best  instruments  such  as  emission  taxes  difficult  or
impossible.  When  that  is  the  case.  the  policy  maker  may  need  to  evaluate  the  various
ways  by  which  emission  reductions  can  be  provided,  in  order  to  stimulate  them
separately-.  For  instance,  for  cars  and  trips,  we  may  think  of  fees  or  sanctions
associated  with  initial  and  periodic  tests  of  emission  factors  as  stimulating  cars
and  fuels  to  be  cleaner,  while  gasoline  and  road  taxes,  mass  transport  policies  and
parking  fees  are  used  to  manage  demand  for  polluting  urban  transport. 3
Perhaps  for  many  reasons  there  is  a  rich  body  of  econometric  studies  of  demand
on  vehicles  and  fuels.  General  studies  of  demand  for  energy,  and  specific  fuels
among  them.  bloomed  in  the  years  following  the  first  oil  price  shock  in  1973,  when
2  In  Eskeland  and  Jimenez  (1992),  this  point  is  elaborated  in  their  distinction
between  direct  instruments  (based  on  monitoring  of  individual  emissions)  and  indirect
instruments  [based  on  indicators  of  emissions,  such  as  the  characteristics  of  cars
and  other  machinery  as  a  proxies  for  "dirtiness".  and  fuel  use  or  other  measures  as
sroxies  for  throughput).
The  case  for  cleaner  cars  and  fewer  trips  is  examined  in  detail  in  Eskeland  (1993),
and  Eskeland  (1992).  A  program  optimally  combining  instruments  economizing  on  trips
and  making  cars  and  fuels  cleaner  was  found  to  cost  65  million  dollars  more  per  year,
if  the  demand  management  instrument,  a  gasoline  tax,  was  excluded,  in  favor  of  more
aggressive  technical  controls.  Since  the  65  million  dollar  estimate  was  based  in  a
more  conservative  price  elasticity  estimate  than  found  in  this  study,  we  may  now
conclude  that  the  costs  of  excluding  demand  management  is  higher.
Han  (1992  a  and  b),  and  Newbery  et  al.  (1988)  discuss  charging  road  users,  but
to  discourage  road  damage  and  congestion,  rather  than  pollution.  McConnell  and
Harrington  (1992),  Hahn  (1993),  Anderson  (1990),  Faiz  et  al.  (1990)  are  exarples  of
detailed  studies  of  technical  control  options  and  costs.
2importing  nations  became  concerned  about  their  vulnerability  to  disruptions  in
imports  and/or  price  increases.  The  costs  to  an  importing  nationL  facing  exogenous
price  shock  will  be  higher  the  lower  is  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  for  the
commodity  in  question-  Among  studies  focusing  on  demand  for  energy,  Fuss'  1975  study
of  energy  use  in  Canadian  manufacturing  and  Pindyck's  book  "The  structure  of  world
energy  demand"  probably  are  the  most  important:  Fuss  for  demonstrating  methodological
breakthroughs  concerning  inter-fuel  substitution.  and  Pindyck  for  a  broad  inquiry
based  on  data  from  many  countries,  including  developing  countries.
Pindyck  points  out  that  there  are  reasons  to  believe  that  previous  results
based  on  the  studies  of  developed  countries  should  not  be  generalized  to  developing
countries.  It  is  conjectured  that  "as  incomes  rise,  additional  expenditures  are  not
allocated  proportionally  to  larger  homes  or  to  more  heat  or  light  in  existing  homes";
therefore,  lower  income  countries  should  have  higher  income  elasticities.  In  the
same  vain,  at  low  income  levels,  most  energy  use  is  a  necessity,  whereas  at  high
income  levels,  energy  use  "becomes  more  discretionary,  allowing  for  greater
substitution  away  from  energy  if  prices  rise";  therefore,  lower  income  countries
should  have  lower  price  elasticities-
Pindyck  compares  results  he  obtairns  from  a  developing  country  sub  sample
(Mexico  and  Brazil)  with  those  from  developed  countries,  and  finds  the  results  to  be
consistent  with  his  expectations  of  lower  price  elasticities  and  higher  income
elasticities  for  gasoline:  "The  estimated  price  elasticity  of  demand  is  -_55  as
compared  to  the  estimate  of  about  -1.3  obtained  for  the  developed  countries"--the
income  elasticity  is  1.22  as  compared  to  .8  for  the  developed  countries".  Comparing
his  results  with  those  of  many  others,  with  lower  elasticities,  he  concludes  that
(their)  "use  of  data  for  a  single  country  is  more  likely  to  elicit  short-  or
intermediate-run  elasticities"  (page  233].
3Another,  not  entirely  independent  development  of  the  1970s  was  regulatory
changes  to  enhance  environmental  quality  and  fuel  efficiency.  With  relevance  for  our
topic,  these  developments  gave  emphasis  to  the  distinction  between  fuel  efficiency,
measured  for  instance  by  liters  consumed  per  kilometer  and  vehicle  kilometers
traveled  by  the  average  household.  Manski  (1983)  proposed  an  elegant  model  of
vehicle  scrappage,  and  Bercovec  (1985)  estimated  a  model  of  vehicle  demand  by  type
including  such  a  scrappage  model.  Using  this  model,  he  could  estimate  the  likely
effect  of  vehicle  regulations  and  the  associated  price  increases  for  new  vehicles,  on
the  turnover  and  properties  of  the  vehicle  stock-  Broader  studies  of  the  behavior  of
auto  ownership  and  use,  are  found  in,  inter  alia,  Winston  et  al.  (1987),  Crandall  et
al.  (1986),  Ingram  et  al.  (1975)  and  Grad  et  aL  (1975).  General  equilibrium
treatments  of  the  effects  of  energy  price  increases  and  environmental  regulations,
with  less  emphasis  on  transportation  and  a  particular  fuel,  are  found  in  Jorgenson
and  Wilcoxen  (1990),  and  in  Hazilla  and  Kopp  [1990].
There  is  also  a  literature  of  empirical  studies  based  on  discrete  choice
models  and  micro-data,  emphasizing  the  sensitivity  of  mode  choice  for  individual
trips  to,  inter-alia,  pricing  and  travel  times  (see,  for  instance.-  Ben-Akiva  and
Lerman  (1985))3  Results  from  this  literature  are  not  generally  comparable  to  those
from  aggregate  data  --  one  of  the  most  obvious  reasons  for  this  is  that  the  mode-
choice  models  usually  assume  many  variables  as  given  in  the  outset  (residential
location,  work-place  location,  car  ownership).  Due  to  these  and  other  important
differences  between  the  two  empirical  bodies  of  literature,  one  should  not  be
surprised  that  estimates  of  such  parameters  as  the  elasticity  of  car  use  to  car
operating  costs  will  usually  be  much  lower  in  these  models  than  in  aggregate  models.
Two  recent  reviews  that  highlight  findings  in  empirical  models  are  Oum,  Waters
and  Young  (1990)  and  Krupnick  (1992)]  Another  recent  study  with  both  a  review  of
4.results  and  empirical  estimates  is  Sterner  (1990).  Sterner  (1990)  surveys  close  to  a
hundred  different  papers  with  360  different  estimated  demand  equations,  and  re-
estimates  the  models  *using  a  larger  data  base  than  those  used  in  the  studies  he
summarizes.  He  points  to  differences  in  results  that  may  be  seen  as  discouraging,
but  concludes  that  there  is  consistency  in  the  results  and  that  demand  does  "adapt  to
changes  in  both  income  and  prices".  For  OECD  countries,  the  sl-jrt  run  elasticities
from  the  dynamic  models  "appear  to  be  around  -0.2  to  -0.3  and  0.35  to  0.55  for  price
and  income  respectively".  The  long  run  elasticities  were  around  -1.0  to  -1.4,  and
0.6  to  1.6  for  price  and  income  respectively.  For  OECD  countries,  the  results  on
price  elasticities  are  consistent  with  those  obtained  by  Pindyck,  but  the  wide  range
for  income  elasticities  cast  a  doubt  on  the  claim  that  they  should  be  systematically
higher  for  developing  countries.
Of  special  interest  is,-  of  course,  Berndt  and  Botero  (1985),  who  obtain
elasticities  for  Mexico  that  are  much  closer  to  those  reported  for  developed
countries  in  Sterner. 4 They  present  estimates  from  Mexico  of  a  model  of  vehicle
stock  adjustments  and  gasoline  demand,  thus  very  similar  to  the  objective  of  our
study.  They  utilize  a  pooled  cross-section  time  series  data  set  and  use  the  dynamic
gasoline  demand  model  discussed  in  Drollas  (1984).  For  the  short  run,  they  find
-0.23  for  price  elasticity  and  0.31  for  income  elasticity.  Long  run  price  and  income
elasticities  they  find  are  -0.96  and  1.25  respectively.
There  are  several  key  issues  that  Berndt  and  Botero  do  not  address.  First,
they  use  pooled  cross-section  time  series  data,  aggregated  to  14  regions;  however,
they  do  not  consider  possible  differences  between  these  regions,  like  geography  and
4  The  higher  income  elasticity  for  residential  electricity  demand  in  Mexico  is
explored  by  Berndt  and  Samaniego  (1984).  They  point  out  -that  once  the  increase  in
demand  for  electricity  do  to  increase  in  accessibility  is  taken  into  account,  the
remaining  demand  behaves  similar  to  electricity  demand  in  industrialized  countries.
Our  study  goes  in  the  same  direction  for  gasoline,  distinguishing  demand  given  the
number  of  cars  from  the  determinants  of  car  ownership-
5infrastructure.  Omission  for  possible  differences  between  regions  may  lead  to  biased
and  inconsistent  results.  Second,  they  do  not  test  whether  the  dynamics  are
adequately  taken  into  account.  In  consequence,  there  could  still  be  important
dynamics  left  as  residuals  in  their  model.  Third,  they  do  not  consider  the  effect  of
gasoline  prices  on  new  car  sales.  This  results  in  the  omission  of  the  indirect
effect  of  gasoline  prices  on  gasoline  consumption,  thus  ignores  an  empirical  effect
of  interest  in  policy.
We  address  these  and  other  issues  that  arise  due  to  the  nature  of  the  data.
We  utilize  a  pooled  cross-section  time  series  data  set  with  annual  observations  from
the  31  states  and  the  federal  district  in  the  Mexican  Federation.  We  solve
unobservability  problem  af  the  state  specific  effects  by  differencing  the  data.  We
explicitly  take  into  account  the  possible  dynamics  in  behaviors  by  incorporating  it
into  the  model,  and  by  testing  the  residuals.  We  also  deal  with  measurement  error
problems,  specifically  in  state-wide  GDP.  by  using  instrumental  variable  estimation.
Section  II  introduces  the  economic  model,  and  III  presents  dynamics  and  the
relationship  between  short  and  long  run  elasticities.  IV  and  V  discuss  data  and
econometric  issues,  respectively,  and  VI  presents  empirical  findings.  Summary  and
conclusions  are  found  in  a  brief  section  VII:
6II.  Economic  Model
We  start  with  the  identity  that  the  total  gasoline  consumption  in  Mexico  is
equal  to  the  average  consumption  times  the  total  number  of  vehicles,  for  each  state
and  time  period:
:  -- it  it  (1)
where,  G  is  the  total  gasoline  consumption,  C.,  is  the  total  consumption  divided  by
it  IL
the  number  of  vehicles,  and  S.  is  the  stock  of  vehicles  (number  or  cars),  at  tine  t,
it
for  state  i.
There  are  two  reasons  for  using  this  form.  First,  this  decomposition  lets  us
analyze  the  role  of  the  car  stock  and  the  average  utilization  rate  separately.  We
have  in  mind  a  model  in  which  there  is  a  fixed  cost  of  having  a  car  available,
associated  with  car  prices,  and  a  variable  utilization  cost,  associated  with  gasoline
prices.  In  such  a  model,  gasoline  consumption  as.  well  as  car  ownership  will  depend
on  car  prices,  gasoline  prices  and  income.5-
Second,  this  form  lets  us  calculate  thie  price  and  income  elasticities  easily.
Elementary  calculations  show  that  the  gasoline  price  elasticity  of  consumption  is  the
sum  of  price  elasticities  for  per  car  consumption  and  total  number  of  cars:
71  t  71c +  71s  (2)
where,  t  is  the  gasoline  price  elasticity  of  total  consumption,  71  is  the  gasoline
price  elasticity  of  gas  consumption  per  car,  and  iis  is  the  gasoline  price  elasticity
of  car  stock.
Next,  we  turn  to  modeling  each  component  of  this  identity.  First,  we  model
gasoline  consumption  per  vehicle,  for  a  given  number  of  vehicles.  We  assume  a
representative  consumer  with  a  utility  function  separable  in  services  rendered  by  a
5  Throughout,  we  shall  work  with  three  market  goods  and  their  prices;  gasoline,  cars
and  other  goods  and  services.  We  normalize  each  price  by  the  price  of  other  goods
and  services,  thus  reducing  the  analysis  to  two  prices  only.
7car  and  other  goods  and  services.  We  assume  the  services  from  the  car  are
proportional  to  gasoline  usage.  In  addition  to  prices  and  income,  there  may  be
differences  between  states,  like  geographies  and  infrastructure  that  affect  gasoline
consumption.  These  additional  effects  are  not  observable  to  us,  but  we  can  summarize
them  in  a  state  specific  variable,  a.,  that  is  constant  through  out  years,  but  varies
across  states.  We  also  incorporate  habit  persistence  by  considering  the  lagged
values  of  the  dependent  variable,  and  write  the  consumption  function  in  the  following
form:
C.  f  fC  GASPRVY.  ;Mi.e)  . (3)
it  it-I'  it
where,  GASPRt  is  the  gasoline  price.  Yi  is  income,  C.  is  the  vector  of  past
t  ~~  ~~~it  it-1
consumption  rates,  a.  is  a  scalar  that  allows  for  the  state  specific  characteristics,
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
e  is  the  vector  of  parameters  dictated  by  the  functional  form,  and  f C )  is.  the
function  implied  by  the  first  order  conditions. 6
Second,  we  model  the  car  stock.  We  assume  that  there  is  an  optimal  car  stock
level  for  each  state.  Consumers  in  each  state  would  calculate  how  much  car  services
they  want,  given  the  prices  and  their  incomes.  As  relevant  prices  for  this  choice,
they  consider  car  prices  and  gasoline  prices.  The  reason  why  we  include  gasoline
6  Note  that  we  assume  that  car  prices  do  not  effect  gasoline  consumption  per  car.  To
examine  this  assumption  in  detail,  assume  that  consiumption  per  car  is  average  fuel-
efficiency  of  the  car  stock  times  the  average  miles  driven:
C =  et(IlCARPR,GASPR)
where,  e  is  the  overall  stock  fuel-efficiency  rate  and  t  is  Smiles  driven.  Then  we
can  decompose  the  change  in  utilization  rate  into  two,  one  due  to  change  in
efficiency,  the  other,  due  to  change  in  number  of  trips  made:
B-/CBCARPR  = C(e/8CARPR)'t  +  (at/aCARPR)le
Change  in  average  fuel-efficiency  due  to  an  increase  in  car  prices  should  be  zero  or
negative  since  less  old  cars  will  be  scrapped  and  fewer  new  purchased.  A  nice  piece
of  evidence  to  this  effect  is  found  in  Kahn  (1986).  On  the  other  hand,  car  prices
will  reduce  or  have  no  effect  on  number  of  cars  in  the  stock,  and  this  in  turn  will,
if  anything,  increase  the  trips  taken  by  each  car.  Our  assumption  that  gasoline
consumption  per  car  is  independent  of  car  prices  thus  amounts  to  assuming  the  sum  of
these  two  effects  equal  zero.
- 8  X  :prices  is  that  we  believe  consumers  do  take  into  account  the  marginal  cost  of  running
a  car  in  their  purchasing  decisions.  They  may  calculate  the  total  discounted  cost  of
gasoline  consumption  into  the  car  price.  This  implies  that  as  gasoline  prices
increase,  we  should  expect  a  decrease  in  the  car  stock.  However,  if  new  cars  are
more  fuel  efficient,  then  new  car  sales  might  increase  as  gasoline  prices  increase.
Considering  both  arguments,  we  do  not  know  a  priori  which  direction  the  gas  prices
may  affect  car  stock.
We can  summarize  these  in  the  following  optimal  stock  level  equation: 7
- Sit  =  s(CARPRt,GASPRt  (it4]i;4
where  S  is  the  optimal  car  stock  level,  Y.  is  the  income  level,  CARPRt  is  a  price
t  it
index  for  new  cars,  ai  is  a  scalar  for  each  state,  representing  state  specific
characteristics,  C  is  a  vector  of  unknown  parameters.
If  there  are  adjustment  costs  in  the  car  stock,  the  car  stock  may  deviate  from
the  optimal  stock.  To  allow  for  this  possibility,  we  decompose  the  current  actual
car  stock  into  the  depreciated  car  stock  that  remained  from  the  previous  year  and  the
new  car  purchases:
sit  =(l-)Sit  + Iit(5)
where,  St  is  the  stock  of  cars,  I  is  the  new  car  purchases,  and  6  is  the t  ~~~~~~~~~t
depreciation  factor.
For  depreciation,  we  shall  consider  two  alternatives.  The  first  one  is  the
constant  depreciation  rate  that  does  not  change  across  the  states  or  through  out  the
years.  While  this  is  a  commonly  used  assumption,  we  believe  it  should  be  tested.  It
can  be  argued  that  the  higher  the  new  car  prices,  the  higher  the  value  of  the  used
7  The  optimal  stock  decision  depends  *on the  expected  value  of  the  service  flow,  and
the  costs  of  holding  the  car  for  one  period  (where  a  "period'  should  be  long  enough
that  the  transaction  costs  are  not  overwhelming].  The  relationship  between  holding
costs  and  car  prices  may  not  be  one  to  one,  so  our  estimate  of  aSt/8CARPRt  is  a
reduced  form  estimate.
9cars  would  be.  and  the  less  the  number  of  cars  that  would  qualify  to  be  scrapped.  An
elegant  model  is  given  by  Manski  (1980).  and  applied  successfully  to  the  US  market  by
Berkovec  (1985).  In  addition.  as  gas  prices  go  up,  if  older  cars  have  lower  fuel
efficiency,  scrappage  should  increase.  Similar  reasoning  goes  for  an  income
increase:  the  higher  incomes  are,  the  less  they  would  be  willing  to  use  and  repair
old  cars.  We  may  test  a  model  allowing  the  depreciation  rate  to  depend  on  these
factors:
&3  d(CARPR .GASPR  Y. I  (6)
it  t  1:  it
where  d(-)  stands  for  the  functional  form  for  the  depreciation  rate.
The  second  component  in  equation  (5),  new  car  purchases,  should  be  a  function  of
the  optimal  car  stock.  Higher  incomes,  or  lower  car  prices  would  increase  the
optimal  car  stock  which  in  turn  would  increase  new  car  sales.
But  there  is  also  a  mechanism  through  which  new  car-purchases  depend  on  the  car
stock  from  the  previous  year.  If  a  partial  adjustment  model  is  assumed,  this
dependence  would  be  reflected  in  the  adjustment  factor,  which  describes  the  extent  to
which  a  difference  between  the  optimal  stock  and  the  previous  year  stock  is  closed
within  a  year. 8 A  linear  partial  adjustment  model  implies  a  negative,  close  to  umity
relationship  between  the  new  car  purchases  and  the  previous  year  stock,  simply
because  the  new  car  purchases  are  equal  to  a  given  fraction  the  optimal  stock,  less
whatever  remains  from  the  previous  year.  However,  Pindyck  (1979)  and  Berndt  and
Botero  (1985)  have  found  evidence  against  these  models;  therefore  we  are  not  going  to
8  The  simple  stock  adjustment  model  assumes  that,  each  period,  consumers  buy  new
vehicles  to  close  some  fraction  of  the  gap  -between  the  optimal  stock  and  the
depreciated  stock  from  previous  year:
S  -(1  -SIS  =Y(S  -(1-S)S  1  0  c  5  1. t  t-1  t  t-
It=  tS-  (l1-)St_)
where  I  is  the  new  car  purchases,  S  is  the  optimal  stock,  5  is  the  depreciation t  t
factor,  and  y  is  the  adjustment  factor.
10restrict  the  functional  form  to  strict  linear  partial  adjustment  model.
A  less  restrictive  stock  adjustment  model  is  allowed  by  the  following
formulation:
I.  =  1(  S  .;r)  (7)
it  it'  it-lV'i
where  a  is  the  parameter  vector,  and  i(-)  indicates  the  functional  form.
Several  caveats  are  in  order.  First,  we  should  emphasize  that  we  assume  that
gasoline  prices  and  car  prices  are  exogenously  determined.  Apart  from  believing
these  assumptions  are  plausible,  testing  them  would  require  more  supply  side
information,  and  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  study.
Second,  we  assume  that  gas  consumption  per  car  is  independernt  of  the  number  of
cars-  It  can  be  argued  that  in  metropolitan  areas,  if  road  space  does  not  increase
commensurately  with  the  number  of  cars,  traffic  congestion  may  increase.  This  in
turn  would  i±crease  gasoLine  consumption  per  mile,  and  perhaps  also  reduce  miles
traveled.  At  a  different  vein,  it  can  also  be  argued  that  number  of  cars  may  be
increasing  because  households  buy  their  second,  or  third  car.  This  will  on  average
reduce  the  gasoline  consumption  per  car  if  the  total  usage  is  less  than  proportional
.to  the  number  of  cars.  We  believe  that  the  net  effect  of  these  on  the  questions  we
are  looking  at  are  negligible,  especially  given  that  we  look  at  the  whole  nation,  not
only  the  metropolitan  areas,  and  that  only  few  families  have  more  than  one  car  in
Mexico.  Never-the-less,  it  is  an  interesting  question  that  needs  fLurther  analysis
with  household  level  data.
Third,  since  we  are  using  aggregate  data  at  the  state  level  in  this  study,  we
are  not  decomposing  the  source  of  heterogeneity  in  the  consumption  and  investment
behavior  into  individual  level.  We  characterize  each  state  by  a  state  specific
unobserved  variable  that  does  not  change  through  time,  and  its  income.  But  we  are
11unable  to  analyze  phenomena  such  as  the  importance  of  variation  of  within  state
income  distribution,  household  size,  age  distribution,  etc.
Fourth,  when  assuming  separability  between  car  services  and  other  consumption.
we  do  not  consider  particular  changes  in  prices  among  other  goods  and  services,  such
as  changes  in  the  availability  or  price  of  alternative  transportation  modes..  A
substantial  change  in  public  transportation  capacity  and  price  would  likely  change
the  pattern  of  new  car  purchases  and  average  gasoline  consumption  in  a  particular
way,  but  is  only  captured  through  its  effect  on  the  overall  price  of  other  goods  and
services  in  our  model.  Consider,  for  example,  a  decrease  in  the  price  of  public
transportation  coupled  with  a  capacity  increase.  Consumers  who  marginally  decide  to
own  and  use  a  car  would  prefer  to  use  public  transportation.  and  the  demand  curve  for
car  ser-vices  would  shift  inwards.  In  consequence,  the  average  income  of  the  people
who  have  cars  would  go  up.  If  such  an  incidence  occurred,  our  analysis  would  only
capture  the  fact  that  the  incomes  at  which  cars  are  bought  was  shifted  upward,  and
the  cross  price  effect  to  these  goods  and  services  was  substantial.  In  consequence,
our  estimates  would  be  too  low  for  income  elasticity  and  too  high  for  price
elasticity,  compared  to  a  model  identifying  the  prices  and  quantities  of  alternative
modes. 9
III.  Dynamics:  Short  Run  and  Long  Run  Elasticities
We  assume  cornstant  income  and  price  elasticities  of  gasoline  consumption  and
investment  in  cars  by  estimating  functions  linear  in  logarithms.  Also,  we
differentiate  between  the  short  run  and  the  lons  run  elasticities  by  formulating  the
equations  in  a  dynamic  form.  This  is  done  by  including  lagged  dependent  variables  as
9  The  opposite  would  be  true,  of  course,  if  price  changes  of  other  goods  and  services
occurred  predominantly  among  goods  and  services  of  little  relevance  to  ckr  and
gasoline  demand.
12explanatory  variables.
From  the  consumption  behavior  defined  in  equation  (3)  we  obtain  the  following
utilization  equation  (or  gasoline  consumption  per  car):
e
it  = 0 3  +  +  13ilnCit_,  +  elInGASPRt  +  BInY  + c  (8)
int  =0  i  it  it
i=1
where  C  is  gasoline  consumption,  GASPR  is  the  gasoline  price,  Y_  is  income,  I  is it  t  it
the  appropriate  lag  length.  a.  are  the  individual  state  effects,  and  cit  is  the
idiosyncratic  error  term  that  is  assumed  to  be  uncorrelated  through  time  and  across
states.  The  parameters  81  and  e2  can  be  interpreted  as  short  run  price  and  income
elasticities  respectively.
Similarly,  we  assume  that  the  investment  equation  and  the  optimal  stock  equation
are  linear  in  the  logarithm  of  their  arguments.  After  substituting  equation  (4)  into
(7],  we  obtain  the  investment  equation  for  new  car  purchases:
k
lnl.  =m  +  i+  , vlnL.  - + p lnCARPR
1t=1iiti  I  t
+4,2lnGASPR  3 + clnY.-  *4W  it-I  +Sit  (9)
where  i  is  the  investment  variable,  CARPR  is  the  car  price  index,  k  is  the
it  t
appropriate  lag  length.  *  are  the  individual  state  effects,  and  w  is  the
idiosyncratic  error  term  that  is  uncorrelated  through  time  and  across  states.
Arguments  similar  to  those  for  the  utilization  equation  (8)  follow  here  too.  The
parameters  ipv  qt,  and  sp3 are  interpreted  as  short  run  price  and  income  elasticities
for  new  car  sales.
While  short  run  elasticities  for  gasoline  consumption  per  car  are  readily  seen
as  the  coefficients  of  the  price  and  income  variables,  the  long  run  elasticities  have
to  be  calculated  from  the  dynamics  of  the  utilization  equation.  We  calculate  the
13implied  long  run  elasticities  for  gasoline  consumption  per  car  by  solving  the
difference  equations  defined  by  setting  the  errors  to  zero..
It  is  trickier  to  calculate  the  elasticities  for  the  car  stock.  For  the  short
run,  tLie  elasticities  are  the  price  and  income  elasticities  of  investment  times  the
ratio  of  investment  to  car  stock  . 0 In  the  long  run,  stocks  should  be  equal  to  the
desired  stock  level  S  and  to  stable  incomes,  investment  should  be  equal  to
depreciation.  Therefore,  the  long  run  elasticities  for  the  car  stock  are  equal  to
the  investment  elasticities  times  the  depreciation  factor.  Long  run  investment
elasticities,  of  course,  like  gasoline  consumption  per  car,  have  to  be  calculated  by
solving  the  difference  equation  defined  by  the  investment  equation..
From  these  elasticities,  we  can  calculate  the  elasticities  for  total  gasoline
consumption.  Due  to  the  identity  in  equation  (1),  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  gas
consumption  is  equal  to  the  snm  of  natural  logarithms  of  per  car  consumption  and  car
stock.  Therefore,  the  elasticities  for  total  gas  consumption  is  the  addition  of
elasticities  for  consumption  and  the  car  stock.
IV.  Data
The  data  is  collected  across  31  states  and  the  federal  district  in  Mexico  from
1982  through  1988.
The  disaggregated  data  on  income  is  obtained  from  Escudero  and  Rivas  (1989).
National  income  data  is  available  annually;  however  disaggregated  income  for  each
state  is  published  only  every  fifth  year.  Escudero  and  Rivas  (1989)  use  the  Chow  and
Lin  (1971) method  to  model  income  levels  by  state  for  the  years  not  publishedL
Iu  The  reason  for  this  is  the  lack  of  a  direct  stock  equation  that  depends  on  prices
and  income.  However,  we  can  derive  the  required  elasticities  by  manipulating  the
investment  equation.  Today's  stock  is  equivalent  to  today's  investment  plus  last
year's  depreciated  stock.  Therefore,  one  percentage  increase  in  investment  implies
an  increase  in  stock  that  is  equal  to  one  percentage  times  the  ratio  of  investment  to
stock.
14Gasoline  consumption  C.  are  calculated  by  dividing  the  total  gasoline
it
consumption  for  each  state  by  the  corresponding  number  of  vehicles  in  stock  from
vehicle  registration  data,  Bureau  of  Statistics.  Throughout  this  study,  onLy  cars
are  considered.  The  gasoline  price  GASPR  is  the  price  of  "nova",  and  does  not t
include  "extra"  or  diesel. 11 All  quantity  variables  are  divided  by  the  corresponding
population  numbers.
New  car  sales  is  from  the  association  of  automobile  manufacturers,  which
publishes  sales  by  state.  Imports  are  negligible.
Whenever  an  "In"  precedes  a  variable  name,  it  means  that  that  variable  is  used
in  logarithmic  form.
V.  Econometric  Issues
Simple  application  of  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  method  would  result  in
parameters  that  are  biased  and  inconsistent.  This  is  due  to  the  combination  of  three
econometric  issues:  i)  the  unobservability  of  the  state  specific  irndividual  effects,
ii)  the  dynamic  specification  that  allows  for  habit  persistence,  and  iii)  measurement
errors  in  the  data  set-  A  method  that  is  capable  of  remedying  these  three  problems
is  the  instrumental  variable  (TV) estimation  method.  In  the  rest  of  this  section,  we
discuss  these  issues  and  remedies  in  detail.
The  first  issue  is  the  possibility  of  individual,  unobservable  characteristics
that  influence  a  state's  demand  :for  given  prices  and  income.  Ideally,  variables
representing  these  characteristics  should  be  included,  to  avoid  the  omitted  variable
problem.  A  state  specific  constant  is  introduced  to  summarize  the  effect  of  such
differences  between  states,  to  the  extent  that  the  characteristics  do  not  change  over
time.  To  the  extent  state  characteristics  change  over  time  (in  a  way  that  is  not
1  As  of  1988,  nova  amounted  to  99.5%  of  the  gasoline  consumption  for  cars.
15fully  reflected  in  changes  in  income,  for  example)  out  model  is  unable  to  capture
this.
The  second  econometric  problem  is  due  to  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  model12. If
there  is  a  lagged  endogenous  variable  as  an  explanatory  variable,  then  the  variance
components  estimator  under  the  random  effects  model  and  the  least  squares  dummy
variable  estimator  under  the  fixed  effects  model  are  biased  and  for  fixed  time  series
also  inconsistent
The  third  issue  is  the  errors  we  have  in  the  income  variable.  Even  if  we  assume
that  the  disaggregate  income  figures  are  correct  for  the  years  that  are  published,
intermediate  years  are  only  estimates  of  the  actual  figures  and  therefore  have  errors
in  them-  Due  to  the  interpolation  methodology,  the  errors  are  uncorrelated  across
time  and  across  individuals.  but  never-the-less,  any  error  is  sufficient  to  cause  the
OLS estimators  to  be  inconsistent.
We  can  solve  the  first  problem  by  using  the  differenced  data,  iLe.,  bv
redefining  the  variables  to  be  changes  across  years,  or  by  using  the  Least  Squares
Dummy  Variable  Estimation  (LSDV)  or  Covariance  Estimation  (CV)  methods 13. Ii  we
difference  the  data,  the  individual  effects,  whether  they  are  fixed  or  random,  would
cancel  out  because  these  effects  do  not  change  over  time.  If  this  were  the  only
problem,  after  differencing,  OLS  estimation  method  would  have  given  unbased  and
consistent  estimates.  However,  having  a  lagged  dependent  variable  as  an  explanatory
variable  or  having  measurement  errors,  render  OLS.  LSDV  and  CV  estimation  methods
invalidl.
The  second  and  the  third  problems  can  be  solved  through  the  method  of
12  For  a  good  exposition,  see  Hsiao  (1986).
13 For  further  details,  see  Hsiao  (1985).
14 See  Hsiao  (1985).
16instrumental  variable  (IV)  estimators-  If  we  find  instruments  that  are  highly
correlated  with  the  explanatory  variables,  but  not  correlated  with  the  errors,  we  can
obtain  consistent  estimates  of  the  coefficients,  even  for  panel  data  with  short  time
series.
The  instruments  we  have  chosen  are  lagged  values  of  the  gasoline  consumption  and
lagged  values  of  income.  Since  the  data  is  differenced  for  estimation,  the  second
lag  of  gas  consumption  will  be  correlated  with  the  lagged  differenced  gas  consumption
that  shows  up  as  an  explanatory  variable,  but  it  will  not  be  correlated  with  the
error  term.  Similarly,  the  second  lag  of  income  will  be  correlated  with  the
differenced  income  variable,  but  because  the  measurement  errors  are  uncorrelated,
this  instrument  will  also  be  uncorrelated  with  the  error  term.  For  estimation,  we
used  the  optimal  instruments  in  the  sense  that  for  time  t,  we  included  all  the  second
lags  of  the  instruments  up  to  t-2.
VI.  Results
As  mentioned,  the  utilization  equation  is  estimated  by  differencing  the  data  to
wipe  out  the  individual  effects.  The  lag  length  is  chosen  by  the  first  lag  that  does
not  have  leave  second  order  serial  correlation  in  the  residuals.  The  results  for  the
utilization  equation  are:. 5
15  All  the  numbers  in  parenthesis  are  the  standard  errors  of  the  coefficient
estimates.
Wald  test.  tests  for  the  significance  of  the  overall  regression.
Sargan  test  has  the  nuLL  hypothesis  that  there  is  no  specification  error,
including  the  choice  of  the  instruments.  The  test  statistic  is  distributed  Xz  under
the  null  hypothesis.  A  Sargan  Test  Statistic  that  is  too  high  with  respect  to  the
degrees  of  freedom  indicates  misspecification.
Robust  test  for  serial  correlation  tests  for  serial  correlation  in  the  error
terms.  In  differenced  data,  we  expect  first  order  serial  correlation.  but  not  second
order  serial  correlation.  This  test  statistics  is  distributed  standard  normal  under
the  null  hypothesis  of  no  serial  correlation.  A  statistic  that  is  greater  thin  2  in
absolute  value  indicates  serial  correlation.
17lnC1 t-  0.1541nC._  - 0.  137lnC.t 2
(0.025)  (0.014)
- 0.785InGASPR  +  0.S22lnGDPI.  +e.
t  it  it
(0.100)  (0.109)
Wald  test  of  joint  significance:  284.82  df=4
Sargan  Test:  20.61  df=21
Robust  test  for  first  order  serial  correlation:  -0.969
Robust  test  for  second  order  serial  correlation:  -0.003
The  t-statistics  obtained  by  dividing  the  coefficients  by  the  standard  errors
indicate  that  all  the  coefricients  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at  95%
confidence  level.  The  significance  of  the  overall  regression  is  also  confirmed  by
the  Wald  test  statistic.  Sargan  test  accepts  the  set  of  instruments  used  in  the
estimation,  and  the  robust  test  for  second  order  serial  correlation  indicates  that
there  is  no  detectable  corre!ation  in  the  error  term.
The  short  run  and  the  implied  long  run  elasticities  are  as  follows: 16
Table  1:  Elasticities  for  Gasoline  Consumption  per  Car
I  7 Short  Run  Implied  Long  Run
Gasoline  Price  Elasticity  |  -0.785  -0.799
Income  Elasticity  0.822  0.836
The  closeness  of  the  short  run  and  the  long  run  elasticities  imply  that  the
economic  agents  tend  to  adjust  almost  fully  within  a  year  to  changes  in  price  or  in
income.  This  may  seem  counter  intuitive,  given  that  lagged  dependent  values  are
statistically  significant.  However,  even  though  past  values  affect  current  values,
these  effects  cancel  each  other  out  in  the  long  run,  since  in  the  long  run,  there  is
no  past  effects.
16  The  steady-state  implied  by  the  model  is
InC  =  0-154lnC  - 0-137lnC  -0.785lnGASPR  +  0.822LnGDP_
When  solved  for  InC,  we  obtain  the  long  run  elasticities  in  table  1.
- ~~~~~~~~18-The  long  run  elasticity  estimates  are  close  to  what  Berndt  and  Botero  (1985)
find  (-0.96  and  0.94  respectively).  However,  their  estimate  of  the  short  run
elasticities  fall  far  short  of  our  estimates.  In  their  study,  they  use  only  one  lag
of  the  dependent  variable  which  has  a  high  coefficient.  In  our  study,  we  showed  that
there  is  still  considerable  serial  correlation  in  the  residuals  that  warrant  for  a
second  lagged  dependent  variable.  This  second  lag  brought  down  the  difference
between  the  long  run  and  the  short  run  effect.
The  investment  equation  is  also  estimated  in  differences.  The  results  for  the
investment  equation  are:
hnI.=  -0.684InC.ARPR  + 0.28llnGASPR
it  t  L
(0.029)  (0  IL3)
+ 3.893LnGDP.  i  0.0751nS  +  ei it  it-I  it
(0-253)  (0.037)
Wald  test  of  joint  significance:  2881.59  df-4
Sargan  Test:  24.48  df=20
Robust  test  for  first  order  serial  correlation:  -1.972
Robust  test  for  second  order  serial  correlation:  0.013
The  t-statistics  indicate  that  all  the  coefficients  except  the  coefficient  of  the
lagged  stock  variable  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at  95%  confidence  level
The  coefficient  of  the  lagged  stock  variable  is  significant  at  90%  confidence  level.
Similar  to  the  utilization  equation,  Sargan  test  accepts  the  set  of  instruments  used
in  the  estimation,  and  the  robust  test  for  second  order  serial  correlation  indicate
that  there  is  no  detectable  correlation  in  the  error  term.
For  this  model,  even  though  dynamics  were  allowed  in  this  regression,  there
are  no  lagged  dependent  variables  because  the  robust  statistics  indicated  that  there
were  no  dynamics  detectable  in  the  error  terms.
19The  elasticities  are  as  follows:
Table  2:  Elasticities  for  New  Car  Sales
Car  Price  Elasticity  -0684
Gas  Price  Elasticity  0.281
Income  Elasticity  3.893
These  results  contrast  those  of  Berndt  and  Botero  (1985)'s  finding  that  gasoline
prices  do  not  effect  new  car  sales,  income  elasticity  is  unity,  and  car  price
elasticity  is  -1.34.  We  believe  the  difference  is  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  we
kept  the  gasoline  prices  in  the  regression  and  we  took  into  account  possible
differences  between  states  which  they  omitted  Thus  difference  in  car  purchases
between  states,  that  they  had  to  relate  to  income  differences  between  states,  are,  m
our  model,  to  a  greater  extent  explained  by  the  state  specific  constants.
The  coefficient  of  the  gasoline  prices  is  positive.  This  result  cannot  be  ruled
out  a  priori  on  theoretical  grounds,  if  we  allow  for  the  fact  that  new  cars  may  be
more  fuel-efficient.  The  efficiency  interpretation  dictates  that,  as  gas  prices  go
up,  the  gasoline  savings  offered  by  newer  cars  make  them  more  attractive,  so  the  gas
price  elasticities  of  new  cars  could  be  positive.  However,  we  should  expect  that
older  cars  are  either  scrapped  or  transferred  to  lower  utilization  rates.
The  coefficient  of  the  lagged  car  stock  is  positive,  and  significant.  It  is
also  in  line  with  other  studies  that  use  a  variation  of  partial  adjustment  model. 7.
The  stock  equation  is  estimated  by  imposing  a  unit  coefficient  on  the  investment
variable  and  assuming  that  depreciation  factor  is  the  same  across  the  states  and
17  Berndt  and  Botero  (1985),  Pindyck  (1979).
20through  out  the  years.  The  results  for  the  stock  equation  are:1 8
Si  4926  + 0.970S  Iit  +  e
it  it-I  it  it
( 15833 (0.008)
Wald  test  of  joint  significance:  13598.8  df=I
Robust  test  for  first  order  serial  correlation:  -0.176
Robust  test  for  second  order  serial  correlation:  -0.969
The  results  imply  that  the  depreciation  rate,  (or  scrappage  actually)  is  quite
low  at  approximately  3%.19  This  is  the  net  depreciation  rate  and  therefore  is  the
depreciation  that  remains  after  repairs  are  done  to  the  cars.
An  alternative  stock  equation  is  estimated.  allowing  depreciation  be  a  function
of  gasoline  prices,  car  prices  and  incorme.  We  performed  a  sensitivity  analysis  and
chose  a  quadratic  approximation  to  this  unknown  function:
2 -&t  a0  +  1lnGASPRt  +  a  2n  GASPRt
+  a  lnCARPR  +  5  In  CARPR  + S5InGDP.  +  6 In2GDP.  (10]. 3  t  4  t  5  t  6  it
We  assume  that  this  relationship  is  exact  and  substitute  into  equation  (4)  The
results  are




a6  =  - 20.34  +  16.461nGASPRt  +  16.391n  GASPRt
it 
(7.030)  (2.938)  (2.756)
2  2
+ 18.18lnCARPRt  - 2.9451n  CARPR  - 0.550inGDPit  +  0.0211n  GDPit
(4.356]  (0.706)  (0.200)  (0.008)
Wald  test  of  joint  significance:  6592.42  df=7
Robust  test  for  first  order  serial  correlation:  -0.026
Robust  test  for  second  order  serial  correlation:  -1.844
18 The  unit  coefficient  is  imposed  by  using  S  - Iias  the  endogenous  variable.
19  Similar  to  Berndt  and  Botero  (1985).
21The  estimation  results  show  that  depreciation  rate  is  affected  significantly  by
prices  and  income.  Strong  price  effects  on  scrappage  were  also  found  in  Berkovec
(1985).  Both  gasoline  prices  and  car  prices  have  the  expected  effects:  as  gasoline
prices  go  up,  on  average,  people  would  want  to  use  more  efficient  cars,  and  scrap  the
old  and  inefficient  cars.  Similarly,  as  car  prices  go  up,  on  average,  people  would
buy  less  new  cars,  the  prices  and  the  value  of  second  hand  cars  would  go  up,  and  this
would  lead  to  a  decrease  in  the  scrappage  rate  (as  in  the  theoretical  model  of
Manski(1983))-  Income  also  has  the  expected  effect  on  the  depreciation  rate.  The
incomes  go  up,  scrappage  increases.  An  interesting  observation  which  may  reflect  on
phenomena  related  to  income  distribution  is  that  the  distribution  of  the  increase  in
income  was  such  that  not  only  did  it  lead  to  more  new  car  sales,  but  also  to  greater
scrappage  of  older  cars.
The  implied  depreciation  rate  is  on  average  473%.  The  rates  are  not  restricted
to  be  between  zero  and  one,  but  except  the  rates  for  1988,  almost  all  of  them  are
Positive  and  close  to  the  average-  In  1988,  there  is  a  dramatic  decrease  in  the  car
price  index,  an  this  pushes  the  depreciation  rate  to  a  region  on  the  quadratic  form
such  that  the  car  prices  and  depreciation  are  positively  correlated,  and  the
resulting  rates  are  negative.  In  general,  however,  the  results  are  significant,  and
as  expected  a  priori.
We  can  use  the  results  presented  above  to  calculate  the  elasticity  of  totaL
gasoline  consumption.  So  far,  the  gasoline  consumption  elasticities  are  calculated,
keeping  the  car  stock  cornstant.  However,  total  gasoline  consumption  varies  not  only.
due  to  changes  in  consumption  per  car,  but  also  due  to  changes  in  the  car  stock.
Equation  (1)  dictates  that  the  total  elasticities  can  be  obtained  by  simple  addition
.22of  consumption  elasticities  and  the  stock  elasticities.
We  calculate  the  short  run  stock  elasticities  by  multiplying  the  investment
elasticities  by  the  average  investment  to  stock  ratio.  The  short  run  income
elasticity  of  car  stock  is  calculated  to  be  0.156.  which  is  the  average  investment  to
stock  ratio  0.04  times.  the  income  elasticity  of  investment,  3.893.  The  short  run  car
price  elasticity  of  The  car  stock  is  -0.025,  which  is  the  car  price  elasticity  of
investment  times  0.04.
The  long  run  elasticities  of  the  car  stock  are  equal  to  the  depreciation  rate
times  the  investment  elasticities.  If  we  use  the  average  depreciation  rate  that  we
obtained  from  the  variable  depreciation  rate  modeL,  then  the  income  elasticity  turns
out  to  be  0.183.  Similarly,  the  long  run  car  price  elasticity  of  car  stock  is
-0029.
Table  3:  Elasticities  for  the  Car  Stock
Short  Run  Long  Run
Car  Price  Elasticity  -0.025  -0.029
Income  Elasticity  0.156  0.183
The  elasticities  for  the  car  stock  calculated  above  exclude  the  possible  changes  in
the  number  of  cars  that  would  be  scrapped  due  to  price  or  income  changes..  If  we  use
the  variable  depreciation  defined  by  equation  (10),  and  use  the  averages  of  prices
and  income,  the  gasoline  price  elasticity  of  car  stock  becomes  1.127,  the  car  price
elasticity  of  car  stock  changes  by  -0.675,  and  income  elasticity  of  car  stock
increases  by  0.056.  However,  especially  for  price  elasticities,  the  variances  are
very  large  and  confidence  intervals  include  zero  values.  Therefore,  we  have  excluded
the  effects  of  scrappage  change  due  to  a  price  or  income  change.  Ihe  net  effects
could  be  negligible,  but  if  anything,  should  be  in  the  direction  implied  by  the
depreciation  estimation  results.
23The  total  elasticities  for  gasoline  consumption  can  be  obtained  by  adding  up
elasticities  for  gasoline  consumption  per  car  and  elasticities  for  car  stock:
Table  4:  Elasticities-for  the  Total  Gasoline  Consumption
Short  Run  Long  Run
Gasoline  Price  Elasticity  -0.785  -0.799
Car  Price  Elasticity  -0.025  -0.029
Income Elasticity  0.978  1  1.019
We  have  also  identified  three  states  that  had  incomes  substantially  higher  then
the  rest.  We  used  dummy  variables  to  differentiate  these  states  and  we  also  let  the
dummy  variables  interact  with  the  income  and  price  variables.  The  results  were  that
non  of  the  coefficients  of  the  dummy  variables  were  significantly  different  from
zero.  This  implies  that  there  is  no  significant  difference  in  elasticities  between
the  rich  states  and  the  rest.  We  present  these  results  without-  regression  outputs
not  to  crowd  the  exposition  with  irrelevant  material. 2 0
VII.  Summary  and  Conclusions
Assuming  that  demand  for  cars  and  their  use  is  determined,  predominantly,  by
income,  prices  of  vehicles,  fuels  and  other  goods  and  services,  we  have  used  a  data
set  with  aggregate  data  from  31  states  and  the  federal  district  over  7  years  in
Mexico  to  estimate  a  demand  model.  The  model,  -with  optimal  stock  adjustments,
displays  almost  full  adjustment  within  a  year,  and  the  price  elasticity  of  total
gasoline  consumption  is  -.79  in  the  short  run  and  -. 8  in  the  long  run.
A  long  rur  income  elasticity  of  one  in  Mexico  is  in  the  same  range  as  those
Z0  Details  can  be  obtained  from  the  authors.
24found  for  developed  countries  in  most  studies  summarized  in  Sterner.  The
elasticities  deviate  somewhat  from  those  of  Pindyck,  and  Berndt  and  Botero  who  find
higher  long  run  income  elasticities.
The  long  run  price  elasticitv  turns  out  to  be  higher  than  those  found  by
Pindyck,  and  close  to  the  lower  end  of  those  estimated  for  developed  countries  in
Sterner.  Even  though  this  estimate  is  lower  that  the  ones  found  in  Berndt  and
Botero,  the  difference  is  not  significant.
The  most  important  difference  in  terms  of  estimated  parameters  may  be  that  our
model  displays  a  more  rapid  adjustment,  so  that  our  short  term  elasticities  are
higher.  We  believe  we  have  found  better  ways  of  dealing  with  the  dynamics  in  this
market,  and  thus  that  our  results  may  be  worth  some  attention.
From  a  poLicy  perspective,  on  the  other  hand,  one  should  be  mostly  concerned
with  the  long  term  elasticities.  When  these  are  large,  as  in  our  case,  it  is  clear
that  pricing  matters  a  great  deal  for  demand.  In  the  case  of  poLluting  goods  and
services,  it  shows  that  demand  management  will  be  important  in  delivering  emission
reductions  in  a  low  cost  control  program.  Another  way  of  stating  this  fact  is  that
the  social  costs  of  adopting  pricing  policies  which  do  not  reflect  social  costs
(costs  of  production  and  pollution,  for  instance),  will  be  high,  because  the
consequent  behavicral  adjustments  will  be  large.
The  fact  that  demand  is  responsive  may  also  be  used  as  inputs  in  discussion  of
other  demand  management  instruments,  such  as  parking  fees,  subway  fares,  tolls,
cordon  pricing,  etc.  As  pointed  out  elsewhere,  the  slope  of  the  demand  curve  can  be
viewed  as  an  expression  of  the  costs  to  consumers  of  sacrificing  a  marginally
attractive  trip.  In  that  context,  one  need  be  careful  with  certain  aggregation
issues.  The  most  important  one  is,  perhaps,  the  fact  that  the  slope  of  the  demand
curve  that  we  have  estimated  here  is  an  aggregate  demand  curve,  and  thus  that  there
25-are  income  distribution  effects  associated  with  demand  management  instruments.  Thus,
the  curve  reflects  how  trips  would  be  sacrificed  according.  to  willingness  to  pay  at
different  price  levels,  with  a  self  selection  of  trips  between  households  as  well  as
for  each  household.  The  incidence  among  households  requires  analysis  of  data  at  the.
household  level  Also,  if  revenue  generating.  instruments  such  as  gasoline  taxes  are
used,  assumptions  need  be  made  about  how  the  revenues  are  used  or  redistributed.
Our  motivation  was  to  find  out  whether  demand  for  these  goods  and  services  is  at  all
responsive  to  demand,  and  the  results  yield  little  support  for  'elasticity
pessimismz&
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29Appendix  I
Equation  (8  is  estimated  in  the  following  form:
A-it  fr  itC.  +  AInGASPRt  +  8lnYit  + c  (6')
It  L  Lt-L  1  t  i  it
i=l
where,  &  is  the  difference  operator,  e.g.,  ACit.=  Cit  Clt..  The  individual
effects.  a.-,  disappear  because  of  differencing.  Residual  Tests  indicated  the
necessity  of  setting  X  =  2;  therefore,  estimation  was  done  by  taking  the  first  three
years  as  initial  values.  The  optimal  instrument  matrix  is
InC  InC  Y  Y  InGASPR  InGASPR  0 1  21Y  2  1  P 2 0-
0  0  1nC-1nY3  °  0
1  3
0
0  -- O  lnCIl  nYl  I  S
The  error  terms  are  assumed  to  be  independently  distributed  across  individuals,  may
be  an  MA process  across  time  and  can  have  an  arbitrary  form  of  heteroscedasticity.
We  use  a  Generalized  Method  of  Moments  procedure  to  estimate  the  model.  This
consists  of  two  steps,  where  in  the  second  step  we  use  the  variance-covariance  matrix
that  is  estimated  in  the  first  step.  For  more  detail,  see  Hansen  (1982).  MacKinnon
and  Davis  (1993)  and  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991).
30Additional  References
Alarcon,  Jorge  G.G.R.  1986.  'La  Demanda  de  Transporte  Urbano  an  el  Area  Metropolitana
de  la  Ciudad  de  Mexico:  Analisis  Teorico  y  una  Aplicacion  Empirica  al  Caso  de  la
Delegacion  Alvaro  Obregon-"  PhLD.  thesis,  Instituto  Tecnologico  Autonomo  de  Mexico,
Mexico,  D.F.
Baltagi,  Badi  H.  and  James  M-  Griffin,  (1983),  "Gasoline  Demand  in  the  OECD:  An
Application  of  Pooling  and  Testing  Procedures"  European  Economic  Review,  22  pp.  117 -
137.
Berkowitz..  Michael  K.,  Nancy  T.  Gallini,  Eric  J.  Miller  and  Robert  A.  Wolfe,  (19721
"Disaggregate  Analysis  of  the  Demand  for  Gasoline"  Canadian  Journal  of  Economics
Bond,  Eric  W.,  (1983]  "Trade  in  Used  Equipment  with  Heterogeneous  Firms'  Journal  of
Political  Economy  vol.  91,  no-  4.  pp689-705.
Carstens,  Federico  M.  Carstens,  and  Ana  Maria  Escalante  Mier.  (1987).  "Precios  en  el
Sector  Automotriz  Mexicano  1974-86:  Un  Analisis  Hedonico."  Ph.D.  thesis,  Instituto
Technologico  Autonomo  de  Mexico,  Mexico,  D.F.
DeWitt,  Diane  E_  and  Hadi  Dowlatabadi.  and  Raymond  J.  Kopp.  (1991)  "Who  Bears  the
Burden  of  Energy  Taxes?"  Discussion  Paper  QE91-12.  Resources  for  the  Future,
Washington,  D.C.
mIades,  Ricardo  W.  (1989).  ta  Contaminaci6n  Atmosferica  Producida  por  Fuentes
M6viles  en  la  Zona  Metropolitana  de  la  Ciudad  de  Mexico:  Un  Instrmento  Eficiente  de
Control."  Ph-D.  thesis,  Instituto  Technologico  Autonomo  de  Mexico,  Mexico,  D.F.
Rust,  John,  (1985)  "Stationary  lEquilibrium  in  a  Market  for  Durable  Assets"
Econometrica  vol  53,  no.  4,  pp  783  - 805.
Sterner,  Thomas,  Carol  Dahl  and  Mikael  Franzen-  (1992).  "Gasoline  Tax  Policy,  Carbon
Emissions  and  the  Global  Environment".  Journal  of  Transwort  Economics  and  Policy.
May.
31Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1292 Services  as a Major  Source  of Growth William Easterly  April 1994  C. Rollison
in Russia  and Other Former  Soviet  Martha  de Melo  84768
States  Gur Ofer
WPS1 293  Product Standards.  Imperfect  Glenn  Harrison  April 1994  N. Artis
Competition,  and  Completion  of the  Thomas  Rutherford  38010
Market  in the European  Union  David  Tarr
WPS1294 Regulations.  Institutions,  and  Hadi  Salehi  Esfahani  April 1994  B. Moore
Economic  Performance:  The Political  35261
Economy  of the Philippines'
Telecommunications  Sector
WPS1.295  Why Higher  Fiscal Spending  Persists  Bruno  Boccara  April 1994  M. Pfeiffenberger
When a Boom  in Primary  Commodities  Ends  34963
WPS1296 Eamings-Related  Mandatory  Salvador  Valdds-Prieto  April 1994  H. Rizkalla
Pensions:  Concepts  for Design  84766
WPS1297 How Relative  Prices  Affect Fuel  Chadles  C- Guo  May1994  C. Jones
Use Pattems in Manufacturing:  James  Ft.  Tybout  37699
Plant-Level  Evidence  from Chile
WPS1298 Capital  Goods  Imports,  the Real  Luis  Serven  May 1994  E Khine
Exchange  Rate,  and the Current  Account  37471
WPS1299 Fiscal Policy  in Classical  and  Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel  May 1994  E. Khine
Keynesian  Open Economies  Luis  Serven  37471
WPS13DO  Dynamic  Response  to Extemal  Klaus  Schmnidt-Hebbel  May 1994  E. Khine
Shocks  in Classical  and Keynesian  Luis  Serven  37471
Economies
WPS1301 Estimating  the Health Effects  of  Bart Ostro  May 1994  C. Jones
Air Pollutants:  A Method  with an  37699
Application  to Jakarta
WPS1302 Sustainability.  Ethical Foundations  Geir  B. Asheim  May 1994  C. Jones
and Economic  Properties  37699
WPS13D3  Conflict  and Cooperation  in Managing Scott Barrett  May 1994  C- Jones
Intemational  Water Resources  37699
WPS13D4  Informal  Gold Mining  and Mercury  Dan  Biller  May 1994  D- Bifler
Pollution  in Brazil  37568
WPS1305 Information  and Price Determination  Nemat  Shafik  June1994  A-Yideru
Under Mass Privatization  36067Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1306  Capital  Flows  and  Long-Term  Ibrahim  A. Elbadawi  June 1994  R. Martin
Equilibrium  Real  Exchange  Rates  Raimundo  Soto  39065
in Chile
WPS1307  How Taxation  Affects  Foreign  Direct  Joosung  Jun  June 1994  S- King-Watson
Investment  (Country  Specific Evidence)  31047
WPS1308  Ownership  and  Corporate  Control  in  Brian  Pinto  June 1994  M. Kam-Cheong
Poland:  Why  State  Firms  Defied  the  Sweder  van  Wijnbergen  39618
Odds
WPS1309 Is Demand  for Polluting  Goods  Gunnar  S  Eskeland  June 1994  C. Jones
Manageable?  An Econometric  Study  Tarhan  N. Feyzioglu  37699
of Car Ownership  and  Use in Mexico